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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1948-1949

legislature left the law unchanged except for the passage of an
act designed to establish an annuity and pension plan for employees of municipally-owned public utilities0 5 The plan proposed thereby should now leave no uncovered public employees
in the state. 6
VIII. TORTS
Novelty in the field of tort law has been provided by both
cases and statutes.' In Mower v. Williams,2 for example, the liability of a highway maintenance man for negligence was considered. The defendant was charged with driving a snow plow into
an intersection and in the path of plaintiff's vehicle. The plaintiff was denied recovery when the court described the defendant's
duty to maintain the highway as one requiring the exercise of
discretion and judgment, calling it a "governmental" one as
distinguished from a ministerial duty. While "governmental"
may not be the proper term to use when speaking of the duty of
an individual, since it produces confusion with the immunity
granted to municipal organizations engaged in that type of function, it is clear that the court has established a precedent whereby
those charged with the maintenance of highways may escape liability for negligence because of the "judgment" required of them.
One might well inquire if any act can be more " Iministerial" than
that of driving a truck on a highway, even though a snow plow
be attached. The reason underlying a grant of immunity, to-wit:
the necessity for freedom of action, can scarcely be cited as sufficient to allow a highway employee to ignore the obligation to use
due care while driving on the highway. The case of Liyihell v.
65 Laws 1949, p. 1222, H. B. 691; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 1112, § 153
et seq.
66 In Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 82 F. Supp. 368
(1949), the federal district court enjoined the state commission from attempting to
require the restoration of train service in the field of interstate commerce.
1The case of Gorczynski v. Nugent, 402 Ill. 147, 83 N. E. (2d) 495 (1949),
affirming 335 Ill. App. 63, 80 N. E. (2d) 418 (1948), dealing with the liability of a
race-track for injury to a minor stable boy, has been discussed above under the
heading of Labor Law. The case of Moore v. Moyle, 335 Ill. App. 342, 82 N. E. (2d)
61 (1948), is commented upon in the section dealing with Corporations, ante.
2402 Ill. 486, 84 N. E. (2d) 435 (1949), reversing 334 Ill. App. 16, 78 N. E. (2d)
529 (1948). Crampton, J., dissented.
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City of Waverly, 3 however, followed traditional doctrines in absolving the city from liability for the death of a boy, killed when
a tree fell on him as he was playing marbles in the park, for the
maintenance of parks has long been regarded as a governmental
function.
The degree of care required of spectators at, and operators
of, exhibitions came up for review in Tomlin v. Miller.4 The plaintiff stood near a fence watching a rodeo staged by the defendant
when a bronco jumped the fence and dislodged a fence pole which
struck and harmed the plaintiff. The Appellate Court, holding
that the evidence sustained a finding that the plaintiff was not
contributorily negligent in taking up a position near the fence,
said that the failure of the operator to take measures sufficient
to insure the safety of the spectators could constitute negligence.
Both "high degree of care" and "reasonable care" were phrases
used by the court in describing the duty of the operator.
Attempts to make the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply
to cases involving the breakage of bottle goods seem to be becoming more frequent. Two such cases reached appellate reviewing
courts in the last year. In one, that of Mabee v. Sutliff & Case
Company, Inc.,5 it was held that the res ipse loquitur presumption could not be allowed where the plaintiff was injured by the
breaking of a jug of sulphuric acid as it was being carried into
the home, following delivery to the doorstep, for the defendant
was said to have lost all control over the jug at the time of the
occurrence. In the other, that of Roper v. Dad's Root Beer Company,6 the court recognized that the thing need not be under the
management and control of the defendant at the time of the accident, for control at the time of the negligent act, at least where
carbonated beverages are concerned, is sufficient. Recovery was
denied, however, because the victim had not eliminated the possi3 335 Ill. App.
4 335 Ill. App.
5 335 Ill. App.
404 Ill. 27, 88 N.

397, 82 N. E. (2d)
267, 81 N. E. (2d)
353, 82 N. E. (2d)
E. (2d) 15 (1949),

6336 Ill. App. 91, 82 N. E.
REvIEw 182.

207 (1948).
760 (1948). Leave to appeal denied.
63 (1948). The holding therein was affirmed in
not in the period of this survey.

(2d)

815 (1948),

noted in
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bility of negligent handling by others between the time the bottle
left the control of the defendant manufacturer and the time of
its explosion.
Bottled goods of still another type are apt to precipitate cases
predicated on the Dram Shop Act. 7 One case of interest on that
subject, the case of Bell v. Poindexter," involved the liability of
the tavern owner and operator for injuries caused by one who had
consumed liquor which had, in fact, been purchased from the
tavern operator by another. It was said that a cause of action
had been stated when it was alleged that the intoxicated person
had been present at the time of the purchase and the operator
knew, or had reasonable ground to believe, that he would consume
part or all of the liquor sold.9
The peculiar rule in Illinois which requires that a plaintiff,
suing for negligence, must show freedom from contributory negligence occasionally gives a deserving plaintiff difficulty. When
a personal representative sues because of the death of the victim,
he sometimes finds himself without the means to prove that the
deceased was exercising due care at the time for his own safety
except as he may have advantage from proof of the deceased
person's prudent habits. The case of Sawyer v. Fleming,10 however, serves to remind the trial lawyer that proof of habit is not
available where the defendant can produce eyewitnesses, even if
they be the defendant's own employees. Another court, discussing
much the same problem in a case charging the defendant with
wilfull and wanton misconduct, pointed out that, in order to succeed, the plaintiff must allege and prove freedom from contributory wilfull and wanton misconduct. 1 There is reason to suspect that this will be news to many lawyers who have heretofore
supposed that the matter was taken care of by an allegation of
freedom from contributory negligence.
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 135.

8336 Ill. App. 541, 84 N. E. (2d) 646 (1949).
9 Discussion of another Dram Shop Act case, that of Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Il.
311, 83 N. E. (2d) 708 (1949), is to be found in the section on Damages, ante.
10 336 Ill. App. 268, 83 N. E. (2d) 360 (1949).
11 Prater v. Buell, 336 Ill. App. 533, 84 N. E. (2d) 676 (1949), noted in 27 CHICAGOKENT LAW REVIEW 253.
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The legislature has seen fit to declare that dog owners may
no longer avoid liability for the animal's first bite, tradition to the
contrary notwithstanding, for a new section charges the owner
for any injury caused by the dog to one who is where he has a
legal right to be. 1 2 Aircraft owners have also been subject to
a financial responsibility law, somewhat akin to the one applicable
to motorists. A security deposit or evidence of insurance coverage is required from owners of aircraft involved in accidents
when damage in excess of $50 has been caused. 13 While placing
them on the same plane as automobile owners, the legislature considerately enacted a "guest statute" exemption in all cases except those growing out of wilfull and wanton misconduct in the
operation of the aircraft. 4

12

Laws 1949, p. 42, H. B. 225; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 8, § 12d.

13 Laws 1949, p. 329, S. B. 530; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 151/,

§ 22.42a
et seq.
14 Laws 1949, p. 334, S. B. 231; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 151/, § 22.83.

